Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Volume 2 | Issue 1

Article 10

2007

Be Careful What You Wish For: China's
Protectionist Regulations of Foreign Direct
Investment Implemented in the Months Before
Completing WTO Accession
Eileen Francis Schneider

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl
Recommended Citation
Eileen F. Schneider, Be Careful What You Wish For: China's Protectionist Regulations of Foreign Direct Investment Implemented in the
Months Before Completing WTO Accession, 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. (2007).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl/vol2/iss1/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR:
CHINA’S PROTECTIONIST REGULATIONS OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IMPLEMENTED IN THE MONTHS BEFORE
COMPLETING WTO ACCESSION
I. INTRODUCTION
The People’s Republic of China attracted the equivalent of $72 billion
U.S. in foreign direct investment in 20051 and $60 billion U.S. in 2004.2
China draws more foreign investment than any other developing nation,3
due largely to investor confidence in China’s economic reforms
implemented after it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.4
From its December 11, 2001 accession,5 China had five years to reform its
markets to a state of compliance with the WTO agreement.6 China’s
obligation to the WTO requires policy changes that will allow foreign firms
to enter the Chinese marketplace and compete fairly with domestic firms.7
While joining the WTO and engaging in further global commerce is
important to Chinese officials8—and was the long-range intention of Deng
Xiaoping’s opening-up of China in 19799—there is still trepidation in the

1. Geoff Dyer, Opportunity in East China, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2006, (FT Report: Business
of Consulting), at 2.
2. Id.
3. Andrew Baston & Mei Fong, In a Strategic Shift, China Hits Foreign Investors With New
Hurdles, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2006, at A1.
4. See generally John I. Gordon & Xuhua Huang, The New Climate for International
Investment in China: Key Reforms Open Up China’s Financial Services, Venture Capital, and
Logistics Sectors, 26 LOS ANGELES LAW. 12 (Nov. 2003) (discussing how regulations
implemented between China’s WTO accession announcement and 2003 were designed to increase
foreign investors’ ease of entry into the Chinese market, and led to increased capital inflow to
China).
5. Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
6. See Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations
on China’s Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
pres01_e/pr243_e.htm (summarizing the commitments that China must undertake to complete
accession); Hong Kong Trade Dev. Council, China’s Accession to the WTO, Embracing the
Opportunities, Meeting the Challenges, http://mas.tdctrade.com/mas/doc/www.tdctrade.com/
wto/tid.htm#2h (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) (listing the schedule for reform that China must abide
by with regard to the banking industry).
7. WTO Ministerial Conference, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of
China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Protocol on China’s Accession]. See also sources
cited supra notes 5, 6.
8. Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 1469 (2000) (articulating the details of China’s WTO accession).
9. William I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent Conflict Between China’s
Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities Market, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 477, 478 (2002). In
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domestic Chinese business community about the increased competition
from foreign firms that the WTO-compliant policies will allow.10 Several
domestic Chinese industry groups have vocalized their fear of competition
by explicitly seeking government protections from foreign competitors.11
The government has answered that pressure with subsequent regulation
reflecting a desire to “soften the impact of foreign competition.”12
The year 2006 should have been another year of unprecedented
investment in China, particularly by firms poised to take advantage of the
WTO-compliant open markets. Instead, regulators blocked foreign
acquisitions and cobbled together a maze of new regulations which may
ultimately deprive Chinese domestic businesses of the capital and
management expertise they require to compete with foreign firms in the
long run. 2006 may be remembered as the year that Chinese regulators
made a dangerous trade-off, swapping the long-term sustainability of
domestic firms in the open Chinese market for a few regulatory roadblocks
that assuaged the protectionist fears of those firms.
Even before the five-year period of reform allowed by the WTO
agreement had expired,13 foreign firms began to enter the domestic Chinese
market and even more made plans to enter after WTO accession was
completed,14 at least as players under their own brand names or as equity
holders in existing Chinese ventures.15 It is no surprise that non-Chinese
businesses want to position themselves for greater access to the 1.3 billionperson market,16 but this goal has not been easily achieved.17
Foreign firms in retail industries favor two ways of gaining greater
access to the Chinese market: (1) acquiring Chinese businesses with
existing infrastructure and licensing in place;18 or (2) establishing individual
1978 Deng Xiaoping adopted the “open door” policy, a series of reforms designed to speed up the
growth of China’s economy through the use of foreign capital. Id.
10. Baston & Fong, supra note 3.
11. Id. See also China’s Foreign Investment Rules to Hurt WVAS Providers, Financial Times
Information Ltd. Asia Intelligence Wire, July 28, 2006, available at http://www.lexis.com (last
visited Nov. 19, 2007).
12. Mure Dickie, China Issues Rules for Foreign Banks, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, at 8.
13. Mure Dickie, More Than 10 Foreign Banks to Open China Subsidiaries, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
20, 2006, at 8. The anniversary of accession and deadline for compliance was December 11, 2006.
14. Id. (listing banks that anticipate entering Chinese market after November 2006). See Karen
Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications, 27 B.C. COMP.
L. REV. 319, 338–39 (2004) (discussing banks that entered Chinese banking market in the period
between WTO commitment and completion of accession).
15. Halverson, supra note 14, at 338.
16. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 114 (CIA 2006), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
17. Baston & Fong, supra note 3.
18. Kate Linebaugh, Wal-Mart to Buy Grocer-Retail Chain in China—Deal Would Bolster
Position in Crucial Overseas Markets After Missteps Elsewhere, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2006, at
A3. In October 2006 Wal-Mart beat the French grocer Carrefour SA in the purchase of Trust-
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branches on the ground under the existing foreign brand name. However,
the process of acquiring Chinese businesses grew increasingly difficult
when the Ministry of Commerce issued new regulations relating to mergers
and acquisitions of domestic companies by foreign investors (the 2006
Regulations) in August 2006.19 The 2006 Regulations, which took effect on
September 8, 2006, supersede the Provisional Regulations promulgated in
April 2003.20 They include an anti-monopoly probe for large transactions,21
provisions to protect “national economic security,”22 and channels for
domestic Chinese businesses to intervene and stall acquisitions of their
Chinese competitors by foreign-owned firms.23 While Chinese officials
have insisted that their enthusiasm for foreign investment has not soured,24
the 2006 Regulations, and their potential to restrict foreign acquisitions,
certainly reflect otherwise.25
Because the WTO guidelines do not allow members to explicitly
prohibit foreign entrants to their markets,26 the 2006 Regulations carefully
provide only the discretion to exclude foreign investment, rather than any

Mart, a large Taiwanese grocery chain with 100 branches across China. The deal has not met
approval by Chinese regulators, but Wal-Mart’s strategy to acquire ready-made outlets instead of
building from the ground up is clear. Wal-Mart’s play for Trust-Mart branches is recognized as a
continuation of Wal-Mart’s global trend of making acquisitions of local retailers as well as an
example of a “[non-Chinese] company[y being] on the hunt for acquisitions” because “getting
approvals to open new stores can be a slow process.” Id. Carrefour SA was still determined to
make a name for itself in the Chinese marketplace; a Chongqing outlet of the supermarket chain
was the site of a violent stampede for discounted cooking oil that killed three people and injured
31. Jamil Anderlini, Stampede at China Supermarket Kills Three, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2007, at 8.
19. Provisions for Foreign Investors to Merge Domestic Enterprises (Decree of the Ministry of
Commerce, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State
Council, State Administration of Taxation, State Administration for Industry and Commerce,
China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Administration of Foreign Exchange), Aug. 8,
2006, effective Sept. 8, 2006), translated at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/ (last visited Nov. 5,
2007) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2006 Regulations]. The title of the law is sometimes translated as the
Interim Provisions on the Takeover of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors. See id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at art. 51.
22. Id. at art. 12.
23. Id. at art. 51 (allowing third parties to call for a review of the transaction).
24. Zhong Ming, New Policy Ensures Better Investment Climate, FIN. TIMES ASIA
INTELLIGENCE WIRE, Sept. 27, 2006, available at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Nov. 19,
2007). Vice Premier Wu Yi is said to have “confirmed the government’s stance that China
remains unchanged in its attitude towards foreign direct investment. What is more, she stressed,
the country is determined to open the door even wider.” Id. The article, written by a Chinese
journalist under a pen name, goes on to mention U.S. Congressional actions to stymie Dubai Ports
World takeover of U.S. port operations as an example of foreign investment restrictions in the
name of national security.
25. Baston & Fong, supra note 3.
26. See Carol G. Liu, New and Foreign Banking Markets: Scaling the Great Wall: An Analysis
of Foreign Banks’ Entry into China, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 397, 403 (2005).
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overt exclusion.27 Before the Regulations became effective, China shielded
domestic industries from competition without violating WTO principles by
bureaucratically stalling several acquisitions of its domestic firms.28 In
2006, the last year before full WTO compliance,29 Chinese bureaucrats
wordlessly delayed or ended a number of pending transactions.30 In early
2006, the Chinese investment landscape was dotted with several high
profile foreign-proposed private equity transactions. For example, the
Carlyle Group (Carlyle), an American private equity firm, bid $375 million
for control of Xugong Construction Machinery (Xugong), a leading
Chinese producer of heavy machinery equipment.31 Citigroup and U.K.
private equity firm CVC Capital Partners formed a joint venture to purchase
30 percent of China’s Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings Ltd. for about
$625 million.32 Citigroup led a separate consortium that bid approximately
$3 billion for an 85 percent stake in Guangdong Development Bank, a
troubled midsize bank in southern China.33
As of October 2006, Chinese regulators had not permitted any of these
transactions.34 The Xugong deal awaited approval by Chinese government
ministries for one year before Carlyle shrunk its proposal to a noncontrolling share.35 Meanwhile, CVC abandoned its efforts to purchase part
of Shandong Chenming Paper36 and bids for a stake in Guandong
Development Bank are now limited to more conservative proposals for noncontrolling shares.37 Each of these transactions awaited approval for several
27. See generally, 2006 Regulations, supra note 19 (setting standards for review of foreign
investment transactions and not calling for exclusion of foreign investment).
28. Linebaugh, supra note 18; Mariko Sanchanta, JFE Indefinitely Delays China Investment,
FIN. TIMES (TOKYO), Sept. 21, 2006. Acquisition of established Chinese firms is a popular way
for foreign retail businesses to enter China because the time consuming and highly political work
to establish local branches and licenses is completed. In manufacturing and natural resources
industries, acquisition of Chinese refining and manufacturing plants is favored for the same
reason; building a plant from the ground up has proven difficult and impossible for non-Chinese
businesses. The Japanese steel manufacturer JFE spent two years negotiating with Chinese
regulators in a failed attempt to gain approval to build a blast furnace in China. In JFE’s case,
locating a furnace in China would have streamlined the steel manufacturer’s operations because
the furnace would refine steel mined in Western China. Id.
29. Understanding the WTO, supra note 5.
30. Chinese Deals, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2006, available at http://www.ft.com/cms; China’s
Chenming Scraps Sale of Stake to Citigroup Venture, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2006, at C5. Carlyle’s
acquisition of Xugong Construction Machinery fell through; Citigroup and CVC Capital Partners
deal to purchase a paper maker was scrapped; and Citigroup’s investment in Guangdong
Development Bank shrank in 2006. Id. See also Battle for Rare Prize, infra note 33.
31. Chinese Deals, supra note 30; Chenming Scraps Sale, supra note 30.
32. Chenming Scraps Sale, supra note 30.
33. Citigroup and Societe Generale Battle for Rare Prize in China – Warts and All, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 8, 2006, at C1.
34. Chenming Scraps Sale, supra note 30; Battle for Rare Prize, supra note 33.
35. Id.
36. Chenming Scraps Sale, supra note 30.
37. Baston & Fong, supra note 3.
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months38 and then fizzled just as the Chinese Ministry of Commerce issued
the 2006 Regulations in August.39
While these barriers to foreign investors may have comforted domestic
firms dreading greater competition in the new open Chinese marketplace,
this note asserts that the 2006 Regulations ultimately will be detrimental to
these domestic firms. Section II considers the background for the Chinese
sentiment against foreign investment in the period between WTO accession
and full compliance, the current climate of “economic nationalism,” and the
manifestation of this climate in industry requests for protection. Section III
argues that regulators answered the protectionist requests when they refused
to approve transactions in 2006, and looks specifically at the 2006
Regulations against the backdrop of prior Chinese regulations on foreign
investment. Section IV asserts that the 2006 Regulations, muddled in the
overlap between centralized ministries and provincial governments, do not
contribute to a legal regime that will sustain a healthy Chinese marketplace.
Section V contends that since many domestic firms are still young, corrupt,
inefficient and only recently independent from the state,40 they actually
need foreign investment and management expertise in order to compete
with the new entrants to the Chinese marketplace. A look at the retail
banking sector illustrates this point.
Chinese regulators should have spent 2006 courting the foreign
investment that would help Chinese businesses attract the capital,
technology and managers necessary to compete against established
international firms. Not only will Chinese firms need foreign money and
expertise to compete around the world, they will also need help at home
when international firms are allowed to vie for a share of the domestic
Chinese market that Chinese firms previously held captive. Instead, Chinese
regulators slowed the influx of foreign dollars, just when Chinese firms
needed it most, leaving them vulnerable to lose domestic market share and
ill-prepared to compete internationally.
II. CHINA’S OBLIGATIONS TO THE WTO AND ECONOMIC
NATIONALISM
In 2006, a Chinese business school professor observed: “It’s a
comfortable time to get tougher with foreigners, having more of them hang
around is not a top priority.”41 This describes the sentiment held by many of
the Chinese business and industry leaders who have watched the growth of
38. Chenming Scraps Sale, supra note 30; Battle for Rare Prize, supra note 33.
39. 2006 Regulations, supra note 19.
40. Jack E. Jirak, Equity Investment in Chinese Banks: A Doorway into China’s Banking
Sector, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 329, 339 (2006) (noting that the “Big Four” Chinese commercial
banks were owned by the government until very recently).
41. Baston & Fong, supra note 3.
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China’s economy over the last five years. Even though foreign investment
has helped the Chinese economy grow, especially between China’s WTO
accession in 2001 and the completion of obligations in 2005,42 the increase
in foreign control has received backlash in the form of requests for
protectionist regulation.43 Beijing has reacted by delaying proposed
acquisitions (like the Xugong, Shangdong and Guangdong transactions) and
through political moves, most notably the removal of the Mayor of
Shanghai, who many believe had gone too far in courting foreign
investment.44 Additionally, China has come under scrutiny from the U.S.
and other nations for artificially setting its currency, the Renminbi (RMB),
at a low price.45 China’s reluctance to see the RMB appreciate may also be
perceived as protectionism and contribute to a backlash holding up the flow
of foreign capital into China. 46
A. CHINA’S OBLIGATIONS TO THE WTO
China’s obligations to the WTO include opening markets for services
and products and accepting the WTO rules by revising Chinese law to
accommodate them.47 These changes had to be in place within five years of
accession, which imposed a December 11, 2006 deadline.48 Since the
accession, restrictions on domestic sales by foreign firms have been
eliminated and thus, foreign firms have taken an increased market share.49
This did not go unnoticed; domestic enterprises have demanded a balance
between protection for Chinese business interests and incentives for
introduction of foreign capital.50

42. Dyer, supra note 1 (noting foreign direct investment influx between 2001 and 2005).
43. Baston & Fong, supra note 3.
44. Clay Chandler, China Takes a Break, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 2006, at 8; James T. Areddy,
Shanghai Probe Hasn’t Finished, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at A8 (“Analysts attributed Mr.
Chen’s downfall in part to the fact that he pursued development policies out of step with those
pushed by Beijing.”).
45. Steven R. Weisman, Paulson Says China Hurts Itself With Economic Policies, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at C3. U.S. Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsay Graham have indicated
that they will pursue legislation taxing U.S. imports from China if Beijing does not take action to
unfix the rate of the RMB that they say is “artificially low.” Id.
46. See generally id. (discussing U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s observation that the
same Chinese protectionism that was preventing China from opening up to competition was
causing reactionary protectionism in the U.S. and may ultimately lead to backlash from other
economic stakeholders in the Chinese economy).
47. Weitseng Chen, Legal Implications of a Rising China: WTO: Time’s Up for Chinese Banks
— China’s Banking Reform and Non-Performing Loan Disposal, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 239 (2006).
(stating that China has to open its banking market to foreign competition and is engaging in
banking reform); JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC
REFORM 319 (2005)
48. WU, supra note 47, at 320; Understanding the WTO, supra note 5.
49. WU, supra note 47,at 307.
50. Id.; Baston & Fong, supra note 3.
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B. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM
Some investors worry that once China fulfills most of its obligations to
the WTO at the end of 2006, it will take an increasingly protective stance
through regulation, shielding domestic firms from competition from and
acquisition by foreign groups with further roadblocks and ambiguous
regulatory hurdles.51 Such protective measures have already been explicitly
requested by some industry groups.52
1. Government Actions Towards Economic Nationalism
Keeping the RMB low compared to the U.S. dollar allows Chinese
exports to be marketed abroad at artificially low prices and keeps imports
into China relatively more expensive than domestically produced
products.53 Non-Chinese businesses worry that, once the Chinese market is
fully open to foreign products, those goods imported into China will be
prohibitively expensive for the Chinese consumer because of the RMB’s
low value.54 This would enable domestic Chinese firms to maintain a large
market share in consumer industries. While the value of the RMB is set by
Beijing,55 national ministries as well as local economic development
regulators have a hand in foreign investment regulation.56
Chen Laingyu was removed as the Secretary of Shanghai’s Communist
Party, the highest official role in Shanghai in September 2006. Beijing cited
a pension scandal as the reason for his termination.57 However, Mr. Chen’s
removal is considered to be a message from Beijing that local officials will
no longer be allowed to approve foreign investment projects at the rate
achieved by Shanghai’s local government.58 Indeed, Shanghai is the center
of Chinese operations for over 120 foreign companies, all approved by local
administrators.59 While Mr. Chen did not set foreign investment policy in
his role, his removal suggests that Beijing will not tolerate local officials
deviating from the national foreign investment policy.60 Two weeks after
Mr. Chen’s dismissal, the Ministry of Commerce issued its first Five-Year

51. Tao Jingzhou, Why China Must Turn Away from Economic Nationalism, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
15, 2006, at 15.
52. Id.
53. Weisman, supra note 45.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See discussion infra Part IV.
57. Chandler, supra note 44; Areddy, supra note 44.
58. James T. Areddy, China Sacks Shanghai Official–Beijing Pushes to Tighten Control,
Consolidate Power Amid Corruption Scandal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2006, at A8.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Plan on Commerce, featuring a plan to centralize foreign investment policy
and remove it from the hands of local officials.61
2. Private Businesses’ Requests for Protection
Some industry sectors have asked for protection from foreign
investment or from the entrance of foreign firms into the Chinese market.62
Retailers have successfully lobbied for a rule restricting the expansion of
large-scale chain stores.63 Soybean processors have asked for restrictions on
the expansion of foreign firms in the industry.64 Chinese auto-makers have
received a boost in the form of vague regulations demanding that foreign
firms with manufacturing plants in China also make vehicles under local
brand names.65 The Chinese bearings industry has publicly opposed the
potential acquisition of Luoyang Bearing Group by Schaeffler, a German
bearings manufacturer.66 A cement industry group asked regulators to
review any foreign acquisition of a cement firm in excess of $100 million
U.S. dollars.67 Members of the telecom industry asked the Ministry of
Information for enhanced rules banning domestic telecom agencies from
selling or leasing their licenses to foreign firms.68 Chinese regulators have
considered steel a special strategic industry.69 In 2005 Beijing announced
that foreign firms cannot purchase controlling shares of domestic steel
companies.70 In this announcement, regulators revealed their plans to
continue architecting the steel industry even after opening the market
according to WTO obligations.71 These concessions to the industry groups
illustrate the nimble and responsive style of Chinese economic regulators
when presented with requests. Though the noted examples are small-scale
and industry-specific, they begin a precedent that could allow broader
protections if translated to a larger scale.

61. Local Officials May Face Less Pressure on Foreign Investment Invitation, XINHUA ECON.
NEWS SERVICE (BEIJING), Oct. 11, 2006, available at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Nov. 19,
2007).
62. Baston & Fong, supra note 3.
63. Id.; China Drafting Rules to Regulate Large-Scale Shopping Outlets, NEWS GUANGDONG,
July 17, 2006, available at http://www.newsgd.com/business/laws/200607170045.htm. The
Ministry of Commerce drafted a rule restricting both domestic and foreign “big box” retailers
from building stores over 10,000 square feet without undergoing a rigorous approval process. Id.
64. Baston & Fong, supra note 3.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Rules to Hurt, supra note 11.
69. Shu-Ching Chen, No Steel for Foreigners in China, DAILY DEAL, July 21, 2005.
70. Id.
71. Id.; Sanchanta, supra note 28. The plan proposed consolidation, a more efficient coastal
relocation of the production locations, and mergers that would give the top-10 producers a 50
percent share by 2010 and a 70 percent share by 2020.
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C. CASE STUDY: CARLYLE GROUP’S ATTEMPTED ACQUISITION OF
XUGONG MACHINERY
Carlyle’s attempted play for Xugong Machinery and the unorthodox
approval process thus far is an example of the unpredictable regulatory
climate hindering the influx of foreign capital. Xugong Group Construction
Machinery Co. is China’s leading construction-equipment machinery
maker.72 The local government of Xuzhou started a public auction process
to sell Xugong in 2004; a deal giving Carlyle an 85 percent stake for $375
million U.S. (3 billion RMB) was announced in November 2005.73 That
deal had not been approved by October 2006.74 While the proposal was
languishing, industry protections and national rules governing foreign
acquisition were introduced, codifying concern over the strong market
position of foreign firms.75 Even without regulatory precedent, the 85
percent proposal was stalled in the approval queue as a handful of
government ministries offered opinions.76 An unprecedented meeting was
held between several ministries of the Chinese government specifically to
discuss the buyout of Xugong.77 Since the proposal, the machinery industry
has lobbied for and received specific protection.78 In June 2006, a
government document declared that the heavy machinery industry would
receive special protection as a “pillar” of the domestic economy, and the
rule includes a provision for extra scrutiny of foreign acquisitions.79 In
October 2006 Carlyle revised their agreement with Xugong, shrinking the
sale to $230 million U.S. for a 50 percent share. The remaining 50 percent
will stay in control of the Xuzhou government.80
It seems counterintuitive that 2006 brought calls for restrictive
regulation from Beijing and Chinese industry groups after foreign
investment had helped the Chinese economy grow so much in the last
decade.81 However, the shift to restrictive regulation probably occurred in
2006 because the deadline was approaching for completion of China’s
WTO obligations.82 The pace of foreign investment between 2001 and 2006
was rapid and continued even without a predictable legal framework for
72. Shu-Ching Chen, China Slows Foreign Industrial Acquisition, DAILY DEAL, July 3, 2006.
73. Id.
74. Andrew Baston & Laura Santani, Carlyle Scales Back Planned Stake in China Firm,
WALL ST. J., Oct.18, 2006, at A12.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Beijing Holds Meeting to Discuss Carlyle-Xugong Deal, CHINA KNOWLEDGE NEWSWIRE,
Aug. 3, 2006, available at http://www.chinaknowledge.com/news/news-detail.aspx?id=
3883&cat=general.
78. Baston & Fong, supra note 3.
79. Id.
80. Baston & Santani, supra note 74.
81. Baston & Fong, supra note 3.
82. Understanding the WTO, supra note 5.
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foreign investors.83 The rate of transactions also increased significantly
between 2001 and 2005 along with the price of individual deals.84 A
timeline of investment in the retail banking sector demonstrates this: in
2003, Citigroup’s $72 million U.S. investment in Shanghai Pudong
Development Bank was a landmark.85 By 2004 that investment was
overshadowed by the $1.75 billion U.S. share of the Bank of
Communications that Hong Kong Singapore Banking Corporation (HSBC)
purchased.86 The year 2005 saw even more deals in the banking sector, with
Bank of America taking a $2.5 billion U.S. position in China Construction
Bank87 alongside Temasek’s $2.4 billion U.S. position in the same bank.88
The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) sold a 10 percent
position to Goldman Sachs and other investors for $3.5 billion later in
2005.89
If Chinese regulators decided to restrict foreign transactions only after
looking on as European90 and American investors took stakes in their
formerly state-owned banks, they made an effective decision. Withholding
approval from acquisitions and tightening regulations has already resulted
in a decline in foreign investment. The January to August period in 2006
saw a 2.1 percent decrease in foreign investment compared to the same
months in 2005, and the pace continued to slow as the 2006 Regulations
were announced.91 In August 2006 China received 8.5 percent less foreign
investment than August 2005.92

83. There is some speculation that foreign investors are so bullish about Chinese investment
that they will not be deterred by any recent regulation, as evidenced by the pace of investment
thus far, even without solid protections in place for foreign investors. Kate Linebaugh, Record
China IPO Could Have Been Even Bigger — ICBC Offering Highlights Global Investors’
Appetite, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2006, at B3. If this were the case, then foreign investment would
continue in sectors that allow it, so that the problem of foreign control would not be quelled, but
industry-specific protections would keep foreign capital away from the sectors that need it most to
compete.
84. Jirak, supra note 40, at 345–46 (outlining the 2003, 2004, and 2005 private equity
investments in the banking sector).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. HSBC is a British corporation. About HSBC, http://www.hsbc.com/1/2/about-hsbc (last
visited Nov. 19, 2007).
91. After Years of Courting Investment, Beijing May be Losing its Ardor for Capital,
FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 2006, at 16.
92. Id.
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III. RECENT HISTORY OF CHINESE REGULATION OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND 2006 REGULATIONS
September 2006 brought significant Ministry of Commerce regulations
on foreign investment.93 The 2006 Regulations introduced a mandatory
anti-monopoly probe if either party has large assets, high revenue in China,
or a significant market share,94 and special scrutiny for transactions
concerning “key industries” or “national economic security.”95 The 2006
Regulations have been touted as the “most far-reaching legislation
governing foreign takeovers” to date96 because they are the first such rules
intended to be applied evenly across industry groups.97 The 2006
Regulations came at the tail end of a period of regulatory relaxation for
foreign investors.98 However, proposed transactions that trigger provisions
in the 2006 Regulations will face much more intense scrutiny from the
Ministry of Commerce than any prior regulation imposed.99 Those
provisions allowing intensified scrutiny, and the bevy of more specific
regulations in the past two years, signify an effort by Chinese policymakers
to slow the rate of foreign investment through greater regulation than in the
past. As of February 2007, the United States had requested that the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body look into the Chinese regulations as well as the
system of taxes on foreign investors.100 No result was reached in the WTO,
and most of the threats against Chinese regulators have come in the form of
warnings or local legislation.101
A. REGULATORY BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURAL OPTIONS FOR
FOREIGN INVESTORS
Foreign investors can be grateful for at least one aspect of the postWTO reforms: the potential for simplified structural options.102 By not
93.
94.
95.
96.

2006 Regulations, supra note 19.
Id. at art. 51.
Id. at art. 12.
Shu-Ching Chen, China Issues New M&A Rules Requiring Anti-Monopoly Probes, DAILY
DEAL, Aug. 14, 2006.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 2006 Regulations, supra note 19, at art. 51.
100. Request for Consultations by the United States, China–Certain Measures Granting
Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions From Taxes and Other Payments, WT/DS358/1 (Feb. 7,
2007).
101. China Trade Policies Draw a Warning from Europe, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2006, at C4;
Weisman, supra note 45 (discussing threat of U.S. legislation).
102. See generally Jessica Zoe Renwald, Foreign Investment Law in the People’s Republic of
China: What to Expect From Enterprise Establishment to Dispute Resolution, 16 IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 453 (2006) (discussing the relative ease of direct investment compared to the
WOFE structures that were previously the only ways for foreign investment to be involved in
China). Although Renwald refers to entities owned entirely by foreign investors as Wholly
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allowing mergers and acquisitions in the past, Chinese regulators have
demanded that foreign operators use joint ventures and other mechanisms to
tap the Chinese market.103 Even those regulations were changing every few
months through the end of 2005.
Often, investors in Chinese companies own shares in an offshore
company and not the Chinese company directly.104 These wholly owned
foreign entities (WOFEs), many of which are based in the Cayman
Islands,105 are structured to allow investors to avoid Chinese taxes while
they are invested.106 Because investment in WOFEs is structured as shares
of the foreign holding company, it offers investors the appealing prospect of
liquidity by allowing investment exits through US or other stock
exchanges.107 In 2002 the WOFE form constituted 65 percent of all foreign
investment in China.108 Some of the most famous successful exits from
venture capital investments in China were listed on U.S. exchanges through
the WOFE format.109 In January and April 2005 the State Administration
for Foreign Exchange (SAFE) issued Circulars designed to rein in Chinese
residents who had avoided taxes by owning Chinese investments through
offshore entities.110 Circular 11 in January111 and Circular 29 in April112
forbid any Chinese citizen or resident foreigner from starting or owning
shares in an offshore company without government approval.113 As far as
the private equity and venture capital community could see in August 2005,
SAFE was not approving any proposed offshore investments by Chinese
residents.114 The head of a public bank noted that, because of the fear of
investing offshore and uncertainty about the standards for approval, venture
Foreign Owned Entities (WFOE’s), a more widely used translation and abbreviation is “WOFEs”
(pronounced woof-ees). Id.; Jerry Borrell, New Laws Slow Chinese Deal Making, VENTURE CAP.
J.,
Aug.
1,
2005,
available
at
http://www.ventureeconomics.com/vcj/protected/
1122124806489.html.
103. Renwald, supra note 102 (discussing history of permitted mechanisms for foreign
investors).
104. Borrell, supra note 102.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. WU, supra note 47, at 301.
109. Borrell, supra note 102. Ctrip.com, Shanda Interactive and Sina.com are listed on NYSE
and Nasdaq, and were publicly offered when they existed as Chinese WOFEs. Id.
110. Id. “Circular” is the translated term for regulations issued by an administrative agency.
111. SAFE Circular No. 11, Circular on Certain Issues Relating to Improvement of Foreign
Exchange Administration for Acquisitions with Foreign Capital (Jan. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/ForeignExchangeAdministration/default.htm.
112. SAFE Circular No. 29, Circular on Issues Relating to Registration Related to Mergers and
Acquisitions by Foreign Investors (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/
FDI_EN/Laws/ForeignExchangeAdministration/default.htm.
113. Id.; SAFE Circular No. 11, supra note 111; Borrell, supra note 102 (discussing the 2005
circulars).
114. Borrell, supra note 102.
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capital funding for offshore entities had almost ceased after SAFE Circulars
11 and 29 were issued.115 In the period following those Circulars, private
equity groups and their portfolio companies arranged financing based on
unsupported agreements, and hoped that legal agreements and financing
would materialize once the approval process got off the ground.116 In
response to unrest about the uncertain state of equity transactions, SAFE
issued Circular 75 on October 21, 2005, regarding Issues Relating to
Financing through Offshore Special Purpose Vehicles by Domestic
Residents and Round Trip Investment.117 Circular 75 upheld the authority of
SAFE to approve transactions, but also eliminated the provision for
Ministry of Commerce approval.118
While transactions including offshore companies were being regulated
in bits and pieces, domestic venture capital transactions were aided by
national sweeping regulation designed to smooth the acquisition process. In
November 2005 the National Development and Reform Commission
announced that domestic venture capital would be regulated by a uniform
set of regulations designed to make Chinese investors more competitive in
the domestic venture capital landscape dominated by non-Chinese
investors.119 Previously, domestic venture capital regulations varied by
province.120 The November 2005 rules helped investors avoid being doubletaxed and announced government help through seed capital and incentive
systems that award investment in certain industries.121
The year-to-year policy changes,122 including the formation of SAFE,
contributed to a generally unpredictable climate for foreign investment. The
2006 Regulations on mergers and acquisitions by foreign investors were a
similar surprise. Although the timing conveniently coincided with pending
transactions that the government had been stalling, the tone of the
Regulations was a marked contrast to the trend toward de-regulation that
foreign investors had enjoyed since China’s WTO accession agreement.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. SAFE Circular No.75, Circular of State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Relevant
Issues Concerning Foreign Exchange Administration of Financing and Return Investments
Undertaken by Domestic Residents through Overseas Special-Purpose Vehicles (Oct. 21, 2005),
available
at
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/ForeignExchangeAdministration/
default.htm.
118. Id.; SAFE Circular No. 11, supra note 111.
119. Shu-Ching Chen, New China Rules Seen as VC Boost, DAILY DEAL, Nov. 16, 2005.
120. Id.
121. Id. The rules also came with restrictions barring margin financing and making it more
difficult to invest in real estate.
122. Id.
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B. SEPTEMBER 2006 ANTI-MONOPOLY PROBE
Foreign acquisitions of Chinese-owned companies after September 8,
2006 must undergo an anti-monopoly probe if either party has assets over 3
billion RMB (about $404 million U.S. dollars in November, 2007), revenue
inside China exceeding 1.5 billion RMB ($202 million U.S. dollars), or a
Chinese market share over 20 percent.123 It is worth noting that a foreign
acquiring company meeting these criteria will trigger the probe regardless
of the size of the Chinese target. The probe will also be triggered if the
foreign party has acquired more than ten related companies in China during
the year.124 If none of those requirements are met, a relevant industry group,
competing Chinese enterprise, or government department may petition the
Ministry of Commerce for a hearing to determine whether the transaction
could be anti-competitive.125 The Ministry then has 90 days to decide if a
hearing is necessary, and then can begin evaluating the transaction for
approval.126
The 2006 Regulations also introduced a few special classes of Chinese
corporations, the acquisitions of which will require special approval from
the Ministry of Commerce.127 Transfer of a controlling interest in a Chinese
company with a “famous brand name” or one in a “key industry” with an
actual or potential effect on “national economic security” is included in this
provision.128 The terms “famous brand name,” “national economic security”
and “key industry” are not defined in the 2006 Regulations.129 This allows
for substantial discretion by the administrators who decide which
transactions trigger the provision. The 2006 Regulations do not offer
guidelines and reporting standards for transacting companies to present
their financial information or assessment of whether the transaction will
affect a “key industry” or “national economic security.” To date no request
for clarification or interpretation has been made to the National People’s
Congress (NPC).
The lack of guidelines may lead to uneven application of the regulation
because it requires that transacting firms police themselves when
determining whether they will trigger the anti-monopoly probe. Firms will
not know whether to complete the probe or what type of inquiry will satisfy
the regulation. The requirement on companies with a market share of 20

123. 2006 Regulations, supra note 19, at art. 51; Chen, supra note 96. Conversion is at 7.4255
RMB to 1 USD. DataBank: Currencies, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2005, § 3, at 15.
124. 2006 Regulations, supra note 19, at art. 51.
125. Id.; 2006 Regulations, supra note 19, at art. 52.
126. 2006 Regulations, supra note 19, at art. 52.
127. Id. at art. 12.
128. Id.
129. See 2006 Regulations, supra note 19.
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percent130 will be problematic for manufacturing companies that contribute
products to several sectors. Furthermore, the benchmark of what is or is not
a monopoly will vary between industries because the 2006 Regulations do
not provide a clear definition of “famous brand name.”131 As there is no
timeline or standard for the reporting and approval processes, prospective
acquisitions could be stalled indefinitely.
IV. THE CHINESE LEGAL CLIMATE FOR FOREIGN
INVESTORS
While China’s problems with adopting the rule of law132 have not
impeded hungry investors thus far,133 how the 2006 Regulations affect
domestic businesses and foreign investors will be a significant indicator of
the sustainability of China’s post-WTO accession open marketplace. Recent
announcements indicate that regulators understand that the legal
implications for foreign investors could be clearer,134 but the process of
truly centralizing the regulation of foreign investment in all industries and
sectors may be too ambitious to expect consolidation in the near future.135
Since Deng Xiaoping’s commitment to open China to the outside world
in 1978,136 China’s legal regime has evolved from the dictatorship it was
during Mao Zedong’s life, but not yet to the point of operating within the
rule of law.137 “Rule of law” is a term generally used to describe legal
systems where law has achieved the status necessary to impose “meaningful
restraints on the State and individual members of the ruling elite.”138
Besides lacking the authority that many western nations ascribe to their
bodies of law, China’s body of law has been hallmarked by ambiguity.139
While that was helpful to administrative ministries as they worked around
130. Chen, supra note 96.
131. This may have more to do with the uneven application of Chinese trademark and patent
law than just the blurry language of the regulation.
132. See generally Rohit Sachdev, Comparing the Legal Foundations of Foreign Direct
Investment in India and China: Law and the Rule of Law in the Indian Foreign Direct Investment
Context, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 167 (2006) (arguing that China’s lack of the rule of law
makes it a better climate for protecting foreign investor’s interests than India’s system based on
the rule of law).
133. Dyer, supra note 1.
134. See generally Local Officials, supra note 61 (discussing announced plans for a more
precise system for local governments to analyze proposed foreign investments).
135. Id.
136. Friedman, supra note 9. In 1978 Deng Xiaoping adopted the “open door” policy, a series
of reforms designed to speed up the growth of China’s economy through the use of foreign capital.
Id.
137. See generally Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred
Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 525 (2002)
(explaining that China is still in the transition towards rule of law).
138. Id. at 472.
139. Renwald, supra note 102, at 456.
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regulation to bolster state-owned businesses,140 the system of subjective
regulations interpreted for each individual transaction would be impractical
when the volume of foreign businesses operating in China increases, as it is
expected to after WTO accession is completed.141 The stalling of the
Xugong, Shangdong and Guangdong deals may have already demonstrated
that wrangling approval from all the relevant ministries and agencies is time
consuming and nearly impossible.142
The history of the People’s Republic of China is brief143 and still in flux
as the single-party communist government modernizes a body of law that
has historically been an “ideological instrument of politics.”144 Chinese law
comes from a variety of central, administrative, and provincial sources.145
The most unique and troublesome source for recent investors has been the
state council’s authority to issue tentative laws to control unprecedented
situations.146 The NPC is the main body of lawmakers and their power in
the central Chinese government is almost entirely unchecked.147 Members
of the NPC elect the president of China, the head judicial leader, the heads
of other departments and ministries, and enact laws.148 The NPC itself is a
3,000-member body made of delegates chosen from the provincial
congresses.149 Mechanisms for the selection of those provincial delegates
and the composition of the NPC’s internal Standing Committee ensure that
the membership of the NPC consists of approved Communist Party
members.150 Although the NPC is empowered to administer regulations
itself,151 it also elects the State Council, which oversees the ministries,
commissions, bureaus, and local governments that make up most of China’s
administrative regulators.152 These ministries and other bureaucratic bodies
are granted the power to create administrative rulings as well.153 The
Ministry of Commerce, which set many of the regulations on foreign
investment, is included in those ranks.154
140. Austan Goolsbee, In the New China, Banks Still Cling to Old Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2006, at C3.
141. Id.; Baston & Fong, supra note 3.
142. See supra Part I.
143. Friedman, supra note 9, at 478. The Communist Revolution in 1949 sparked the formation
of the law-making bodies that exist today.
144. Eric Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 57 (2001).
145. Zhonguo Renmin Ginghegu Xianfa [P.R.C. Constitution] (1982), available at
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
146. Renwald, supra note 102, at 459.
147. Id. at 456–57.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 457.
150. Id.
151. P.R.C. Constitution, supra note 145.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.; 2006 Regulations, supra note 19.
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While the NPC serves as the root of power in the Chinese government,
many avenues exist through which regulation may be handed down. This
affects foreign investors when the approval of proposed transactions is
delayed by the wide variety of policy-setting bodies that have the authority
to speak on the transactions. The provision in the 2006 Regulations
allowing a third party to call a hearing questioning a proposed foreign
acquisition155 will certainly draw many more concerned private and
bureaucratic parties into the approval process, and possibly result in even
further delays.
V. CHINESE BUSINESSES WILL NEED FOREIGN CAPITAL AND
EXPERTISE TO COMPETE EFFECTIVELY WITH THE
FOREIGN FIRMS THAT ARE EXPECTED TO ENTER
CHINA’S MARKETPLACE
While the regulations against foreign investment may not be an
immediate death knell for them, domestic Chinese firms could certainly
benefit from injections of expertise and capital while international firms are
circling the 1.3 billion-person market, looking for a way to capitalize on
it.156 In March 2007, the U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce for
International Trade, Frank Lavin, noted that the health of China’s domestic
businesses would be aided by investment from foreign firms: “The
controversy shouldn’t be Carlyle-Xugong . . . I think China needs 100
Carlyle Groups to come in and buy 100 Xugongs.”157 Foreign investment
would offer enhanced technology and more sophisticated management and
marketing strategy to any sector, but the consumer financial services
industry offers a ripe example. The domestic Chinese market for consumer
banking is enormous, and the Chinese firms occupying the market have
underperformed.158 This makes it an attractive market for successful and
established foreign banks, like Citigroup, which have adopted a philosophy
of “if you can’t buy ‘em, join ‘em” as they carve out a market share on their
own after their attempts to invest in Chinese banks were rebuffed.159 If
Chinese banks are not prepared to compete, they risk not only losing ground

155. 2006 Regulations, supra note 19, at art. 52.
156. THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 16, at 114. See Part II for discussion of foreign
transactions pending in 2006.
157. Reuters, US Official Warns China to Open Markets, FINANCIALTIMES.COM, Mar. 19,
2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0de47ae0-ddac-11db-8d42-000b5df10621.html (last visited Nov.
19, 2007).
158. Battle for Rare Prize, supra note 33; Wendy Dobson & Anil K Kashyap, The
Contradiction in China’s Gradualist Banking Reforms (Initiative on Global Fin. Mkts., Working
Paper No. 4, 2006), available at http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/anil.kashyap/research/Contradiction
percent20in percent20China.pdf; see infra notes 181–86 and accompanying text.
159. Citigroup’s China Focus, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2006, at A3.
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at home, but ultimately failing to gain a significant share in the consumer
banking market abroad.
The banking industry is particularly affected by the recent regulatory
developments because China’s largest banks were owned and run by the
government until 2005 and 2006.160 The WTO obligations call for China to
allow established foreign retail banks to open on the ground in China and
market directly to Chinese consumers by the end of 2006.161 However, this
can benefit the existing Chinese banks by offering expertise, particularly
related to the limited scope of retail consumer products that have not been
offered by the government-owned Big Four banks in the past.162 The
number of proposed acquisitions in the retail banking market suggests that
foreign banks prefer to make that connection by acquiring or joining with
existing banks instead of forging ahead alone to break ground on
completely new branches.163 The WTO obligations allow foreign banks to
establish their own freestanding businesses in China, and if they are forced
to do so without merging with or acquiring a Chinese bank, they will
certainly offer the retail products popularized in western markets. Chinese
banks will not be prepared to compete with them unless foreign expertise is
employed in their product development management.
Although the Big Four domestic Chinese banks have completed public
offerings, there is some concern that Beijing will continue to manage the
banking industry.164 Indeed, Beijing exhibited anxiety about the impending
entrance of foreign lenders as far back as early 2005, when the vicechairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission announced at the
inaugural China Financial Reform Forum that “we need to focus on having
an appropriate level of protection for Chinese banks.”165 At that point there
was an implicit rule banning multinational banks from taking stakes in more
than two Chinese banks, and in October 2006 the only foreign banks
granted commercial-banking licenses were Citigroup Inc. and HSBC.166
So far, government management of the banks has led to poor
performance, allowing government officials to award loans at their personal
160. See generally Dobson & Kashyap, supra note 158; Shu-Ching Chen, Beijing Moves to
Protect Local Banks, DAILY DEAL, Apr. 28, 2005. The Big Four went public in 2005 and 2006.
161. Hong Kong Trade Development Council, supra note 6. (stating that commitments must be
met within 5 years of accession, which began December 11, 2005).
162. Jirak, supra note 40, at 351. The Big Four are the specialized banks that received the
commercial lending business separated from the People’s Bank of China in 1986; they are the
Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China. Id.
163. Chen, supra note 160; Battle for Rare Prize, supra note 33; Moving the Market: Morgan
Stanley Expands in China with Bank Deal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2006, at C3.
164. Austan Goolsbee, In the New China, Banks Still Cling to Old Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2006, at C3.
165. Chen, supra note 160.
166. Id.; Moving the Market, supra note 163.
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discretion to non-creditworthy recipients or without securing collateral.167
However, government bail-outs have kept the bad loans from affecting the
IPO prospects of at least one large bank, the ICBC.168 There, the percentage
of non-performing loans was reduced from 34 percent to 5 percent in the
last year when the bad loans were removed from ICBC’s books and shuttled
to separate asset management companies.169
ICBC has also benefited from the overall growth in the Chinese
banking market, where deposits and personal and corporate loans have
experienced double-digit increases each year since 2001.170 Since Chinese
law has kept deposit rates low and lending rates higher, ICBC’s profits
doubled between 2004 and 2006.171 ICBC’s public offering earned $21.9
billion U.S., but it drew $350 billion U.S. in demand.172 While that figure is
exciting, it is probably more an indicator of foreign investor excitement
about claiming a stake in a large Chinese offering than the health of
ICBC.173 To illustrate the increase in excitement, compare Goldman Sachs’
5.8 percent share of ICBC, for which they paid $2.6 billion U.S. in April
2006,174 to the end of 2001, when all foreign investment in the Chinese
banking and insurance industries totaled only $1.4 billion U.S.175
The Chinese banking market does warrant such zeal by investors; it is
growing even faster than the country’s economy, paced by the rise in
personal wealth in China.176 The excitement over the industry’s growth and
jealousy by investors who were not invited to ICBC’s offering have incited
foreign investment in other banks as well, some with even less attractive
portfolios than ICBC.177
In late 2006, Morgan Stanley planned to acquire the Nan Tung bank, a
one-branch operation dealing only with non-Chinese currencies.178
Guangdong Development Bank in southern China may appear generally
unattractive with $4.5 billion U.S. in bad loans, but it spurred a bidding war
between Citigroup and Societe Generale, the French bank.179 Retail banks
with such poor performance as Guangdong and such small market share as
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Goolsbee, supra note 164.
Id.
Id.
A Dragon Stirs; China’s Biggest Bank, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 2006, at 78.
Id.
Linebaugh, supra note 83. The demand for IPO shares probably also can be attributed to
Goldman Sachs’ marketing expertise and reputation for involvement in profitable IPOs.
173. Id.
174. A Dragon Stirs, supra note 170.
175. WU, supra note 47, at 304 (citing National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook
(Zhongguo Tongi Nianjian) Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2003).
176. A Dragon Stirs, supra note 170.
177. Id.
178. Id.; Moving the Market, supra note 163; A Dragon Stirs, supra note 170.
179. Battle for Rare Prize, supra note 33.
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Nan Tung would not normally be courted by multinationals. However,
because the approval process for licensing in China is so ambiguous and
local, the licensing that small banks have already obtained is attractive to
foreign firms who are uncertain that they would be granted licenses as new
entrants to the banking market. Guangdong also offers 501 existing
branches and all the local and municipal licenses to operate them.180
However, other potential foreign investors watched from the sidelines in
2006 as big private transactions, like the bid for Guangdong, waited in
limbo for approval from Chinese authorities.181 Chinese regulators seemed
perfectly happy with the slowdown, even indicating that protecting the
domestic banking industry’s market share starts with keeping foreign
investors out of indigenous banks.182
Despite the growth in the market for banking in China, experts believe
that the sustainability of the domestic banking industry could benefit from
an increased role for foreign entrants, and that fear over harm to existing
indigenous banks (particularly the Big Four) is unwarranted.183 The
presence of foreign banks was not threatening the market share of Chinese
banks by the time of the 2006 Regulations. Further, a future increase in
foreign bank outlets has the potential to help the domestic banking industry
take advantage of consumer banking products that the Chinese market has
not yet been exposed to. In 2006, foreign banks operating in China were
not occupying a significant share of the domestic retail market.184 A 2005
survey of foreign banks by PriceWaterhouseCoopers showed that foreign
banks operating in mainland China drew on a mostly non-Chinese customer
base.185 Experience in Japan indicates that foreign banks will not steal away
Chinese banking customers as they enter.186 When foreign banks first
entered the market in Japan, domestic customers were not quick to switch
their savings or borrowing to new banks.187
The foreign banks surveyed anticipated growth in retail banking
because Chinese customers have not been exposed to many products that
have been successful in western markets.188 Credit cards, mortgages and
investment vehicles have not been popularized by the current Big Four
players in Chinese retail banking because they do not have the expertise to

180. Id.
181. Chandler, supra note 44. See also supra Part II.C. (2006 foreign investment numbers are
lower than those in 2005).
182. Chen, supra note 160.
183. Dobson & Kashyap, supra note 158.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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develop and offer such products.189 Foreign entrants who have already
developed retail products and have experience tailoring and marketing them
may be better equipped to educate Chinese consumers and popularize the
products first.190 Morgan Stanley’s Nan Tung acquisition is a good example
of the pathway that foreign investors must take to make inroads into
Chinese retail banking. It is a very small holding, but the commercialbanking license is not currently available to foreign banks and is a
necessary prerequisite to introducing and popularizing retail products and
services such as credit cards and investment instruments in the Chinese
market.191
VII. CONCLUSION
The sentiment from Chinese firms and industry groups requesting
protection is understandable as the post-WTO open market will expose
them to competition not only from foreign firms on their own soil, but also
from the Chinese firms already backed by foreign capital or traded on
public exchanges. However, the Chinese government has reacted by
holding up foreign acquisitions and mandating time-consuming and vague
reporting requirements through the 2006 Regulations. Such a reaction has
merely quelled public unrest at the foreign economic presence and has not
contributed to a legal regime that will foster efficient and competitive
Chinese businesses in the open market. The health of Chinese enterprises
will not be ensured just by slowing the flow of foreign capital and foreign
acquisitions. As China’s WTO accession has brought its market into the
open world economy, self-seclusion for Chinese businesses is no longer
possible to sustain.192 Chinese private firms and the remaining state-owned
enterprises will only suffer from excessive protection as they are closed off
from the benefits of foreign management and capital. The problems will be
particularly ironic and damaging for key industries, like banking, that have
historically been hampered by inefficiency while leaving huge domestic
Chinese markets untapped.
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